International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News item: 03 November 2011

PhD Database PhD Database
Name: Mark Manulis
Topic: Provably Secure Group Key Exchange
Category: cryptographic protocols

Description: The rapid and promising development of applications and communication systems designed for groups of participants like groupware, computer supported collaborative work systems, or digital conference systems implies exigence of mechanisms providing adequate security properties. These mechanisms can be designed based on the foundations of cryptography.

\r\n\r\nGroup key exchange protocols are multi-party cryptographic protocols those participants compute a shared secret key that can then be used in conjunction with other cryptographic constructions like encryption schemes and message authentication codes for the purpose of privacy, confidentiality and authentication.

\r\n\r\nSecurity confidence of modern cryptographic constructions can be increased via adequate security proofs. The paradigm of provable security gains in importance for all kinds of cryptographic constructions, including group key exchange protocols those security issues represent the scope of this dissertation.

\r\n\r\nWe give an analytical overview of the state-of-the-art research in this area and identify strengths and weaknesses of many previous approaches. We suggest a new approach in form of a security model those stronger definitions provide background for more confident security analyzes and proofs. Additionally, we present a number of generic solutions (compilers) that can be applied to independently designed group key exchange protocols in order to enhance security thereof with respect to various goals considered by our security model. Finally, we present a concrete group key exchange protocol that provably satisfies the apparently strongest currently available formally specified security requirements.[...]
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