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Candidates must hold a PhD in mathematics, computer science or related areas. Furthermore, they must have a demonstrated record of top-quality research in foundations of public-key cryptography. This is usually proved by publications in IACR conferences or workshops.
Please send your application per email (preferably as PDF) to Eike Kiltz (eike.kiltz at rub.de). The application should include a full CV, a cover letter motivating you application, a short description of your two best research articles, and at least two candidates for reference letters. Review of applications will begin immediately and will continue until the position is filled, the starting date is flexible.
During more than a decade of service on the IACR Board as an officer, director, and conference chair, I led the establishment of verifiable electronic IACR elections, the policy of anonymous submission to IACR conferences, and the reduction of conference registration costs. I seek the opportunity to continue my service.
I have been active with IACR for over 10 years. During that time, I've identified areas which I believe could be improved. If elected as a director, I will focus on improving communication with members, expanding the reach of our publications by accommodating broader topics, and bringing new students to conferences.
I am a crypto researcher since the mid 90s, and I am currently serving as IACR membership secretary. As a director of the IACR, I will work to support our transition to open-access publication model, and to enhance the services that the IACR offers to the cryptology research community.
I've been serving on program committees of IACR conferences since 2002 and I'll be PC co-chair of EUROCRYPT 2013 and 2014. I would like to promote scientific excellence and open-access publishing. Please vote for Phong Nguyen. Thank you.
It has been a pleasure to serve the IACR membership as Secretary (2007-2009) and as General Chair of CRYPTO'10. Now, I would very much like to serve as a Director of the Board. Please vote for me!
Having served as both a prior PC and upcoming GC I have experience on the aspects of two of the main tasks the board assigns. What attracted me to Crypto was the combination of theory and practice, and I will aim to promote this if elected.
Candidates must have, or expect to obtain, an excellent first degree (or equivalent) in Computer Science or Electrical & Electronic Engineering. The nature of the project will require the candidate to develop a good appreciation for legal and law enforcement aspects of IT and Internet abuse. Therefore, applicants should also have a willingness to work in an interdisciplinary environment and acquire more skills (theoretical and practical) throughout the project duration.
This 3 year studentship will cover tuition fees at the home/EU rate and a basic tax-free stipend of at least £13,590 per year.
Applications can be made online from the 3rd October at the link below
Please read the Before you apply section of this page for admissions statements, entry requirements and frequently asked questions. When you apply you will be asked to select a PhD programme by department, please select the department which best matches your research interests. Please also state the research group you are interested in working with in the Research Details section of the application form.
The online system is currently closed for essential maintenance; if you would prefer to submit a paper application before the 3rd October, please email pg-admissions (at) bristol.ac.uk for a PDF version of the form, stating the studentship to which you are applying.
The successful candidate will be responsible for the scientific area associated with side-channel attack resilience in the design and implementation of cryptographic protocols. The candidate should have 2 years post-doctoral experience and a solid publication record in at least one of the following areas: 1) the efficient implementation of low-level cryptographic primitives and countermeasures against side-channel attacks; 2) the theoretical aspects of side-channel attack resilience (e.g. leakage resilient cryptography).
Salary: 24K EUR per Year
Duration: 1 Year (renewable)
These are pure research positions, without teaching duties, in the context of the ARES project (http://www.aresproject.org). Successful candidates are supposed to publish in security and privacy in a broad sense.
Depending on when the candidate got her/his Ph.D., we can offer junior or senior post-docs, an international work environment and plenty of travel money to present results at security and privacy conferences.
starting date: 1.12.2011 (negotiable)
duration: 2.5 years (negotiable)
\r\nThe RC4 stream cipher has two components. These are the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and the Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA). The KSA uses a secret key $K[0\\ldots l-1]$ of $l$ bytes to scramble a permutation $S[0\\ldots N-1]$ of $N$ bytes using two indices $i$ and $j$. The PRGA uses this scrambled permutation and performs further shuffle-exchanges to produce keystream output bytes $z_1, z_2, z_3,\\ldots$.\r\n
\r\nFirst, we perform a detailed theoretical analysis of RC4 KSA. We derive explicit formulae for the probabilities with which the permutation bytes $S[y]$ at any stage of the KSA are biased to the secret key. Theoretical proofs of these probabilities have been left open since Roos\' observation (1995). Along the same line, we analyze a generalization of the RC4 KSA corresponding to a class of update functions of\r\nthe indices involved in the swaps and find that such weaknesses are intrinsic in shuffle-exchange kind of key scheduling. Moreover, for the first time we show that biases towards the secret key also exist in $S[S[y]], S[S[S[y]]]$, and so on, for initial values of $y$. We also study a weakness of the RC4 Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) that has already been noted by Mantin and Mironov. We present a simple proof that each permutation byte after the KSA is\r\nsignificantly biased (either positive or negative) towards many values in the range $0, \\ldots, N-1$. Further, we present a detailed empirical study over Mantin\'s work when the theoretical formulae vary significantly from\r\nexperimental results due to repetition of short keys in RC4.\r\n
\r\nBased on our analysis of the key scheduling, for the first time we show that the secret key of RC4 can be recovered from the state information in a time much less than the exhaustive search with good probability. Our research ge[...]
The candidate will be employed as a Junior Researcher at the Faculty of Sciences, Technology and Communication of the University of Luxembourg. The initial contract will be for three years (40 hours/week) with a six month trial period. The contract may be extended once by one year.