International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News item: 26 January 2016

Alex Biryukov, Léo Perrin, Aleksei Udovenko
ePrint Report ePrint Report
The Russian Federation's standardization agency has recently published a hash function called Streebog and a 128-bit block cipher called Kuznyechik. Both of these algorithms use the same 8-bit S-Box but its design rationale was never made public.

In this paper, we reverse-engineer this S-Box and reveal its hidden structure. It is based on a sort of 2-round Feistel Network where exclusive-or is replaced by a finite field multiplication. This structure is hidden by two different linear layers applied before and after. In total, five different 4-bit S-Boxes, a multiplexer,two 8-bit linear permutations and two finite field multiplications in a field of size $2^{4}$ are needed to compute the S-Box.

The knowledge of this decomposition allows a much more efficient hardware implementation by dividing the area and the delay by 2.5 and 8 respectively. However, the small 4-bit S-Boxes do not have very good cryptographic properties. In fact, one of them has a probability 1 differential.

We then generalize the method we used to partially recover the linear layers used to whiten the core of this S-Box and illustrate it with a generic decomposition attack against 4-round Feistel Networks whitened with unknown linear layers. Our attack exploits a particular pattern arising in the Linear Approximations Table of such functions.
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