IACR News item: 10 November 2015
Aloni Cohen, Justin Holmgren, Ryo Nishimaki, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, Daniel Wichs
ePrint ReportThe work of Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan, and Yang (CRYPTO\'01 and Journal of ACM 59(2)) shows that, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), such watermarking is \\textit{impossible} if the marked program $\\widetilde{C}$ evaluates the original program with {perfect correctness}. In this work we show that, assuming iO, such watermarking is \\textit{possible} if the marked program $\\widetilde{C}$ is allowed to err with even a negligible probability, which would be undetectable to the user.
Our watermarking schemes are {\\em public key}, meaning that we use a secret marking key to embed marks in programs, and a public detection key that allows anyone to detect marks in programs. Our schemes are secure against {\\em chosen program attacks} where the adversary is given oracle access to the marking functionality. We emphasize that our security notion of watermark non-removability considers arbitrary adversarial strategies to modify the marked program, in contrast to the prior works (Nishimaki, EUROCRYPT \'13).
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