IACR News item: 17 June 2015
Arthur Gervais, Hubert Ritzdorf, Ghassan O. Karame, Srdjan Capkun
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we show that current scalability measures adopted by Bitcoin come at odds with the security of the system. More specifically, we show that an adversary can exploit these measures in order to effectively delay the propagation of transactions and blocks to specific nodes--without causing a network partitioning in the system. We show that this allows the adversary to easily mount Denial-of-Service attacks, considerably increase its mining advantage in the network, and double-spend transactions in spite of the current countermeasures adopted by Bitcoin. Based on our results, we propose a number of countermeasures in order to enhance the security of Bitcoin without deteriorating its scalability.
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