IACR News item: 16 June 2015
Victor Costan, Ilia Lebedev, Srinivas Devadas
ePrint ReportSGX in its API, but protects against an important class of additional software attacks, including cache timing and memory access pattern attacks. It does so via a principled approach to eliminating entire attack surfaces through isolation rather than plugging attack-specific privacy leaks.
Sanctum\'s hardware changes over a standard RISC architecture do not impact the cycle time, as they do not extend critical execution paths. Sanctum does not change any major CPU building block (e.g., ALU, MMU, cache), and only requires additional hardware at the interfaces between these building blocks corresponding to less than two percent chip area overhead. Over a set of benchmarks, Sanctum\'s worst observed overhead for isolated execution is 14.6% over an idealized insecure baseline.
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