IACR News item: 01 May 2015
Dana Dachman-Soled, Nils Fleischhacker, Jonathan Katz, Anna Lysyanskaya, Dominique Schröder
ePrint ReportInitial work assumed that all PUFs, even those created by an attacker, are honestly generated.
Subsequently, researchers have investigated models in which an adversary can create malicious PUFs with arbitrary behavior. Researchers have considered both malicious PUFs that might be stateful, as well as malicious PUFs that can have arbitrary behavior but are guaranteed to be stateless.
We settle the main open questions regarding secure computation in the malicious-PUF model:
-- We prove that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is impossible, even in the stand-alone setting, if the adversary can construct (malicious) stateful PUFs.
-- We show that universally composable two-party computation is possible if the attacker is limited to creating (malicious) stateless PUFs. Our protocols are simple and efficient, and do not require any cryptographic assumptions.
Additional news items may be found on the IACR news page.