International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News item: 23 April 2015

Jeremy Jean, Ivica Nikolic, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang, Shuang Wu
ePrint Report ePrint Report
In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the

PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while

no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that

one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and

then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the

full PRINCE_core for several instances of the $\\alpha$ parameter (yet not the

one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the

structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key

recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher.

We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known

key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we

provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known

plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.

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