International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News item: 22 April 2015

Aggelos Kiayias, Thomas Zacharias, Bingsheng Zhang
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We present the cryptographic implementation of \"DEMOS\", a new e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional \"setup\" assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a \"randomness beacon\" or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of end-to-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in

the form of two concise attack games.

Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging.

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