IACR News item: 21 April 2015
Ryo Nishimaki, Daniel Wichs
ePrint ReportThe work of Barak et al. (CRYPTO\'01 and J.ACM, 59(2)) shows that, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), such watermarking is \\textit{impossible} if the marked program $\\widetilde{C}$ evaluates the original program with {perfect correctness}. In this work we show that, assuming iO, such watermarking is \\textit{possible} if the marked program $\\widetilde{C}$ is allowed to err with even a negligible probability, which would be undetectable to the user.
We construct such a watermarking scheme with a secret-marking key used to embed marks in programs, and a public-detection key that allows anyone to detect marks in programs. For our security definition, we assume that the adversary can get oracle access to the marking functionality.
We emphasize that our security notion of watermark non-removability considers arbitrary adversarial strategies to modify the marked program -- for example, an adversary could obfuscate the marked program and this should not remove the mark. This is in contrast to the prior works, such as that of Nishimaki (EUROCRYPT \'13), which only consider restricted removal strategies that preserve the original structure of the marked program (e.g., as a vector of group elements), but do not provide security against arbitrary strategies.
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