IACR News item: 11 April 2015
Patrick Märtens
ePrint Reportrequirements (especially which is unforgeable and truly anonymous) in the random oracle model. In other existing divisible e-cash systems that are truly anonymous, either the bandwidth of withdrawing
depends on K or the bandwidth of spending depends on k. Moreover, using some techniques of the work of Canard, Pointcheval, Sanders and Traoré we are also able to prove the security in the standard model.
Furthermore, we show an efficient attack against the unforgeability of Canard and Gouget\'s divisible e-cash scheme (FC \'10).
Finally, we extend our scheme to a divisible e-cash system that provides withdrawing and spending of an arbitrary value of coins (not necessarily a power of two) and give an extension to a fair e-cash
scheme.
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