IACR News item: 01 April 2015
Ralf Kuesters, Tomasz Truderung
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we carry out the first formal cryptographic analysis of re-encryption RPC mix nets. We show that these mix nets, with fixes recently proposed by Khazaei and Wikstr{\\\"o}m, provide a good level of verifiability, and more precisely, accountability: cheating mix servers, who try to manipulate the election outcome, are caught with high probability. Moreover, we show that all attacks that would break the privacy of voters\' inputs are caught with a probability of at least $1/4$. In many cases, for example, when penalties are severe or reputation can be lost, adversaries might not be willing to take this risk, and hence, would behave in a way that avoids this risk. Now, for such a class of ``risk-avoiding\'\' adversaries, we show that re-encryption RPC mix nets provide a good level of privacy, even if only one mix server is honest.
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