IACR News item: 19 March 2015
David Bernhard, Veronique Cortier, David Galindo, Olivier Pereira, Bogdan Warinschi
ePrint ReportBased on our findings, we propose a new game-based definition of privacy which we call BPRIV. We also identify a new property which we call {\\em strong consistency}, needed to express that tallying does not leak sensitive information. We validate our security notions by showing that BPRIV, strong consistency and strong correctness for a voting scheme imply its security in a simulation-based sense. This result also yields a proof technique for proving entropy-based notions of privacy which offer the strongest security guarantees but are hard
to prove directly: first prove your scheme BPRIV, strongly consistent and strongly correct,
then study the entropy-based privacy of the result function of the election, which is a much easier task.
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