IACR News item: 27 February 2015
S. Dov Gordon, Jonathan Katz, Feng-Hao Liu, Elaine Shi, Hong-Sheng Zhou
ePrint ReportHere we conduct a systematic study of MVC, with the goal of satisfying stronger security requirements. We begin by introducing a simulation-based notion of security that provides a unified way of defining soundness and privacy, and automatically captures several attacks not addressed in previous work. We then explore the feasibility of achieving this notion of security. Assuming no collusion between the server and the clients, we demonstrate a protocol for multi-client verifiable computation that achieves strong security in several respects. When server-client collusion is possible, we show (somewhat surprisingly) that simulation-based security cannot be achieved in general, even assuming semi-honest behavior.
Additional news items may be found on the IACR news page.