International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In [AGP14] Ananth et al. showed that continual leakage-resilient non-transferable interactive proofs exist when a leak-free input-encoding phase is allowed and a common reference string is available. They left open the problem of removing the need of a common reference string.

In [BGJK12] Boyle et al. showed that for some interesting functionalities continual leakage-resilient secure computation is possible when leak-free interactive preprocessing and input-encoding phases are allowed. They left open the problem of removing the interactive preprocessing.

In this work we study the above questions. Our main contribution shows that leakage-resilient black-box zero-knowledge is impossible when relying on a leak free input-encoding phase only (i.e., without CRS/preprocessing). Additionally, we also show that leakage-resilient multi-party computation for all functionalities is impossible (regardless of the number of players assuming just one corrupted player) when relying only on a leak-free input-encoding phase (i.e., without CRS/preprocessing).

Our results are achieved by means of a new technique to prove lower bounds for leakage-resilient security. We use leakage queries to run an execution of a communication-efficient insecure (i.e., non-simulatable) protocol in the head of the adversary. Moreover our work shows an interesting connection between leakage resilience and security against reset attacks.