International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News item: 13 August 2014

Michel Abdalla, Fabrice Benhamouda, David Pointcheval
ePrint Report ePrint Report
In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol with a proof of security in the standard model. In its most efficient instantiation, the new protocol has only two flows of communication and a total of 7 group elements and its proof of security is based on the plain DDH assumption. To achieve this goal, we first propose a variant of the Gennaro-Lindell/Katz-Ostrovsky-Yung (GL/KOY) PAKE protocol, in which the encryption schemes used to generate the first- and second-flow messages are only required to be semantically secure against plaintext-checking attacks (IND-PCA) and chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), respectively. Unlike semantic security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA), an IND-PCA adversary is only given access to an oracle which says whether or not a given ciphertext encrypts a given message. Next, we design a more efficient variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme with shorter ciphertexts together with an associated hash proof system and we prove its IND-PCA security under the plain DDH assumption. We believe that the new IND-PCA scheme is of independent interest, since it yields, in particular, the most efficient IND-CCA encryption scheme under plain DDH for small messages.

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