International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News item: 04 March 2014

Sebastian Faust, Pratyay Mukherjee, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Daniele Venturi
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Non-malleable codes are a natural relaxation of error correcting/detecting codes that have useful applications in the context of tamper resilient cryptography. Informally, a code is non-malleable if an adversary trying to tamper with an encoding of a given message can only leave it unchanged or modify it to the encoding of a completely unrelated value. This paper introduces an extension of the

standard non-malleability security notion - so-called continuous non-malleability - where we allow the adversary to tamper continuously with an encoding. This is in contrast to the standard notion of

non-malleable codes where the adversary only is allowed to tamper a single time with an encoding. We show how to construct continuous non-malleable codes in the common split-state model where an encoding consist of two parts and the tampering can be arbitrary but has to be independent with both parts. Our main contributions are outlined below:

1. We propose a new uniqueness requirement of split-state codes which states that it is computationally hard to find two codewords C = (X0;X1) and C0 = (X0;X1\') such that both codewords are valid, but X0 is the same in both C and C0. A simple attack shows that uniqueness

is necessary to achieve continuous non-malleability in the split-state model. Moreover, we illustrate that none of the existing constructions satisfies our uniqueness property and hence is not secure in the continuous setting.

2. We construct a split-state code satisfying continuous non-malleability. Our scheme is based

on the inner product function, collision-resistant hashing and non-interactive zero-knowledge

proofs of knowledge and requires an untamperable common reference string.

3. We apply continuous non-malleable codes to protect arbitrary cryptographic primitives against tampering attacks. Previous applications of non-malleable codes in this setting required to

perfectly erase the entire memory after each execution and and required the adversary to be restricted in memory. We show that continuous non-malleable codes avoid these restrictions.

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