International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Signcryption is a useful paradigm which simultaneously offers both the functions of encryption and signature in a single logic step. It would be interesting to make signcryption certificateless to ease the heavy burden of certificate management in traditional public key cryptography (PKC) and solve the key escrow problem in Identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). Most certificateless signcryption (CL-SC) schemes are constructed in the random oracle model instead of the standard model. By exploiting Bellare and Shoup\'s one-time signature, Hwang et al.\'s certificateless encryption and Li et al.\'s identity-based signcryption, this paper proposes a new CL-SC scheme secure in the standard model. It is proven that our CL-SC scheme satisfies semantic security and unforgeability against the outside adversary and malicious-but-passive key generation center (KGC) assuming the hardness of bilinear decision Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problems. Our security proofs do not depend on random oracles.