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01:17 [Pub][ePrint]


22:17 [Pub][ePrint] A Secure Text Messaging Protocol, by Gary Belvin

  Mobile text messages are currently vulnerable to inspection, modification, and replay by network operators and those that influence network operators. This paper describes a set of protocols that provide end-to-end message confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity over the high latency, low bandwidth, Short Message Service provided by GSM networks.

16:17 [Pub][ePrint] Channel Equalization for Side Channel Attacks, by Colin O\'Flynn and Zhizhang (David) Chen

  This paper introduces the use of channel equalization as a method of simplifying side channel analysis attacks, by eeffectively collapsing all points in a power measurement trace into a single random variable. This uses a simple Finite Impulse Response (FIR) linear equalizer, which has been studied extensively in communications systems. In addition the estimation of a channel model is used in developing the Channel Estimation Analysis (CEA), which is a generic attack requiring similar assumptions to the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack. Both channel equalization and the CEA attack are straight-forward to apply to real systems, and Python examples are provided. Results of attacking unprotected AES-128 and protected AES-256RSM on a microcontroller are provided.

16:17 [Pub][ePrint] General Impossibility of Group Homomorphic Encryption in the Quantum World, by Frederik Armknecht and Tommaso Gagliardoni and Stefan Katzenbeisser and Andreas Peter

  Group homomorphic encryption represents one of the most important building blocks in modern cryptography. It forms the basis of widely-used, more sophisticated primitives, such as CCA2-secure encryption or secure multiparty computation. Unfortunately, recent advances in quantum computation show that many of the existing schemes completely break down once quantum computers reach maturity (mainly due to Shor\'s algorithm). This leads to the challenge of constructing quantum-resistant group homomorphic cryptosystems.

In this work, we prove the general impossibility of (abelian) group homomorphic encryption in the presence of quantum adversaries, when assuming the IND-CPA security notion as the minimal security requirement. To this end, we prove a new result on the probability of sampling generating sets of finite (sub-)groups if sampling is done with respect to an arbitrary, unknown distribution. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition on homomorphic encryption schemes for our quantum attack to work and discuss its satisfiability in non-group homomorphic cases. The impact of our results on recent fully homomorphic encryption schemes poses itself as an open question.

16:17 [Pub][ePrint] Lyra: Password-Based Key Derivation with Tunable Memory and Processing Costs, by Leonardo C. Almeida and Ewerton R. Andrade and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Marcos A. Simplicio Jr.

  We present Lyra, a password-based key derivation scheme based on cryptographic sponges. Lyra was designed to be strictly sequential (i.e., not easily parallelizable), providing strong security even against attackers that use multiple processing cores (e.g., custom hardware or a powerful GPU). At the same time, it is very simple to implement in software and allows legitimate users to fine-tune its memory and processing costs according to the desired level of security against brute force password guessing. We compare Lyra with similar-purpose state-of-the-art solutions, showing how our proposal provides a higher security level and overcomes limitations of existing schemes. Specfically, we show that if we fix Lyra\'s total processing time t in a legitimate platform, the cost of a memory-free attack against the algorithm is exponential, while the best known result in the literature (namely, against the scrypt algorithm) is quadratic. In addition, for an identical same processing time, Lyra allows for a higher memory usage than its counterparts, further increasing the cost of brute force attacks.

16:17 [Pub][ePrint] On the Design of LIL Tests for (Pseudo) Random Generators and Some Experimental Results, by Yongge Wang

  Random numbers have been one of the most useful

objects in statistics, computer science, cryptography, modeling,

simulation, and other applications though it is very dicult to

construct true randomness. Many solutions (e.g., cryptographic

pseudorandom generators) have been proposed to harness or

simulate randomness and many statistical testing techniques have

been proposed to determine whether a pseudorandom generator

produces high quality randomness. NIST SP800-22 (2010) proposes

the state of art testing suite for (pseudo) random generators

to detect deviations of a binary sequence from randomness. On

the one hand, as a counter example to NIST SP800-22 test suite,

it is easy to construct functions that are considered as GOOD

pseudorandom generators by NIST SP800-22 test suite though

the output of these functions are easily distinguishable from the

uniform distribution. Thus these functions are not pseudorandom

generators by definition. On the other hand, NIST SP800-22

does not cover some of the important laws for randomness. Two

fundamental limit theorems about random binary strings are

the central limit theorem and the law of the iterated logarithm

(LIL). Several frequency related tests in NIST SP800-22 cover

the central limit theorem while no NIST SP800-22 test covers


This paper proposes techniques to address the above challenges

that NIST SP800-22 testing suite faces. Firstly, we propose

statistical distance based testing techniques for (pseudo) random

generators to reduce the above mentioned Type II errors in NIST

SP800-22 test suite. Secondly, we propose LIL based statistical

testing techniques, calculate the probabilities, and carry out

experimental tests on widely used pseudorandom generators

by generating around 30TB of pseudorandom sequences. The

experimental results show that for a sample size of 1000 sequences

(2TB), the statistical distance between the generated sequences

and the uniform distribution is around 0.07 (with 0 for statistically

indistinguishable and 1 for completely distinguishable)

and the root-mean-square deviation is around 0.005. Though the

statistical distance 0.07 and RMSD 0.005 are acceptable for some

applications, for a cryptographic \"random oracle\", the preferred

statistical distance should be smaller than 0.03 and RMSD be

smaller than 0.001 at the sample size 1000. These results justify

the importance of LIL testing techniques designed in this paper.

The experimental results in this paper are reproducible and the

raw experimental data are available at author\'s website.

16:17 [Pub][ePrint] Scale-Invariant Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers, by Jean-Sébastien Coron and Tancrède Lepoint and Mehdi Tibouchi

  At Crypto 2012, Brakerski constructed a scale-invariant fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the LWE problem, in which the same modulus is used throughout the evaluation process, instead of a ladder of moduli when doing \"modulus switching\". In this paper we describe a variant of the van Dijk et al. FHE scheme over the integers with the same scale-invariant property. Our scheme has a single secret modulus whose size is linear in the multiplicative depth of the circuit to be homomorphically evaluated, instead of exponential; we therefore construct a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. This scheme can be transformed into a pure fully homomorphic encryption scheme using bootstrapping, and its security is still based on the Approximate-GCD problem.

We also describe an implementation of the homomorphic evaluation of the full AES encryption circuit, and obtain significantly improved performance compared to previous implementations: about 23 seconds (resp. 3 minutes) per AES block at the 72-bit (resp. 80-bit) security level on a mid-range workstation.

Finally, we prove the equivalence between the (error-free) decisional Approximate-GCD problem introduced by Cheon et al. (Eurocrypt 2013) and the classical computational Approximate-GCD problem. This equivalence allows to get rid of the additional noise in all the integer-based FHE schemes described so far, and therefore to simplify their security proof.

16:17 [Pub][ePrint] Lattice-based Group Signature Scheme with Verifier-local Revocation, by Adeline Langlois and San Ling and Khoa Nguyen and Huaxiong Wang

  Support of membership revocation is a desirable functionality for any group signature scheme. Among the known revocation approaches, verifier-local revocation (VLR) seems to be the most flexible one, because it only requires the verifiers to possess some up-to-date revocation information, but not the signers. All of the contemporary VLR group signatures operate in the bilinear map setting, and all of them will be insecure once quantum computers become a reality. In this work, we introduce the first lattice-based VLR group signature, and thus, the first such scheme that is believed to be quantum-resistant. In comparison with existing lattice-based group signatures, our scheme has several noticeable advantages: support of membership revocation, logarithmic-size signatures, and weaker security assumption. In the random oracle model, our scheme is proved to be secure based on the hardness of the SIVP_soft-O(n^{1.5}) problem in general lattices - an assumption that is as weak as those of state-of-the-art lattice-based standard signatures. Moreover, our construction works without relying on encryption schemes, which is an intriguing feature for group signatures.

16:17 [Pub][ePrint] Authenticated Encryption with SPECK, by Chase Manny

  In this paper, we provide performance measures for software implementations of the NSA-designed Speck128 block cipher together with various existing authenticated encryption modes. We investigated Speck128 using GCM, CCM, EAX, OCB3, COPA, and PAEAD-1, and we briefly discuss performance advantages and disadvantages of each mode. Our results indicate that Speck128 is capable of performing extremely fast authenticated encryption, as fast as 3.4 cycles/byte on a modern x86-based 64-bit processor.

17:28 [Event][New] DASec 2014: The First International Workshop on Big Data Analytics for Security

  Submission: 10 February 2014
Notification: 14 March 2014
From June 30 to July 3
Location: Madrid, Spain
More Information:

10:17 [Pub][ePrint] Studying Potential Side Channel Leakages on an Embedded Biometric Comparison System, by Maël Berthier and Yves Bocktaels and Julien Bringer and Hervé Chabanne and Taoufik Chouta and Jean-Luc Danger

  We study in this work the potential side channel leakages of a hardware biometric comparison system that has been designed for fingerprints.

An embedded biometric system for comparison aims at comparing a stored biometric data with a freshly acquired one without the need to send the stored biometric data outside the system. Here one may try to retrieve the stored data via side channel, similarly as for embedded cryptographic modules where one may try to exploit side channel for attacking the modules.

On one hand, we show that we can find partial information by the means of simple Side Channel Analysis that may help to retrieve the stored fingerprint. On the other hand, we illustrate that reconstructing the fingerprint remains not trivial and we give some simple countermeasures to protect further the comparison algorithm.