IACR News item: 25 November 2013
Rafael Pass, Sidharth Telang, Karn Seth
ePrint Report(a.k.a. graded) encoding schemes: roughly speaking, we require that if
an algebraic attacker (obeying the multi-linear restrictions) cannot tell
apart two constant-length sequences $\\vec{m}_0$, $\\vec{m}_1$ in the
presence of some other elements $\\vec{z}$, then
encodings of these sequences should be indistinguishable.
Assuming the existence of semantically secure multi-linear encodings
and the LWE assumption, we demonstrate the existence of
indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits.
Additionally, if we assume an strengthening of
semantic security, our construction yields extractatability
obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits.
We rely on the beautiful candidate obfuscation constructions
of Garg et al (FOCS\'13), Brakerski and Rothblum (TCC\'14) and Barak et
al (ePrint\'13) that were proven secure only in idealized generic
multilinear encoding models,
and develop new techniques for demonstrating security in the standard model, based only on
semantical security of multi-linear encoding (which trivially holds in
the generic multilinear encoding model).
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