International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News item: 30 August 2013

Nethanel Gelernter, Amir Herzberg
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We study provably secure anonymity, focusing on ultimate

anonymity - strongest-possible anonymity requirements and

adversaries. We begin with rigorous definition of anonymity

against wide range of computationally-bounded attackers,

including eavesdroppers, malicious peers, malicious destina-tions, and their combinations. Following the work of Hevia and Micciancio [15], our definition is generic, and captures dierent notions of anonymity (e.g., unobservability and sender anonymity).

We then study the feasibility of ultimate anonymity. We

show there is a protocol satisfying this requirement, but with

absurd (although polynomial) inefficiency and overhead. We

show that such inefficiency and overhead is unavoidable for

`ultimate anonymity\'. We then present a slightly-relaxed

requirement and present feasible protocols for it.

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