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- Deep understanding of theory and implementation of Security protocols and applied cryptography
- Demonstrated expertise with computer architecture
- A strong programming background and experience with functional programming languages is preferred
- Experience in developing prototypes in a research environment
- A demonstrated potential to excel in collaborative research
- PhD in computer science or computer engineering
In July of 2012, the Department of Computing Security at RIT was established to address critical security challenges that cut across computing disciplines. The department engages in a wide range of research and teaching activities, including: big data analytics, cryptology and covert communications, digital forensics, mobile devices, networks, privacy, security measurement, security pedagogy, sensors, software, and systems security. Through these activities, the department seeks to advance the discipline and to meet the rapidly growing need for computing security professionals.
The successful candidate will be ready to assume the leadership and administrative responsibilities of the department. A key role will be to lead the department in shaping and expanding its research and scholarship profile. Applicants are required to have a Ph.D. or equivalent in a related field and experience commensurate with that of a full professor. Applicants must have demonstrated research excellence in computing security, a track record of external funding, and a strong commitment to undergraduate and graduate education.
Candidates should visit http://careers.rit.edu and search 575BR for specific information about the position and the application process. Refer to http://www.rit.edu/gccis for information about RIT and the B. Thomas Golisano College of Computing and Information Sciences.
RIT is an equal opportunity employer that promotes and values diversity, pluralism, and inclusion. For more information or inquiries, please visit http://www.rit.edu/diversity/titleix.html.
Our construction is based on multilinear maps, and can be instantiated using the recent candidates proposed by Garg, Gentry and Halevi (EUROCRYPT 2013) and by Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi (CRYPTO 2013). We show that the construction is secure when the conjunction is drawn from a distribution, under mild assumptions on the distribution. Security follows from multilinear entropic variants of the Diffie-Hellman assumption. We conjecture that our construction is secure for any conjunction, regardless of the distribution from which it is drawn. We offer supporting evidence for this conjecture, proving that our obfuscator is secure for any conjunction against generic adversaries.
Certain applications require the ability to disclose part of the message to the server. We define partially blind password-based signatures and construct a scheme based that we prove secure, based on a novel computational problem related to computing discrete logarithms.
Our scheme is based on Nyberg-Rueppel signatures. We give a variant of Nyberg-Rueppel signatures that we prove secure based on our novel computational problem.
Unlike previous password-based signature schemes, our scheme can be instantiated using elliptic curve arithmetic over small prime fields. This is important for many applications
This paper discusses this cryptographic protocol, and in particular the ballot submission phase.
The security of the protocol relies on a novel hardness assumption similar to Decision Diffie-Hellman. While DDH is a claim that a random subgroup of a non-cyclic group is indistinguishable from the whole group, our assumption is related to the indistinguishability of certain special subgroups. We discuss this question in some detail.
defined by elements from an hyperplane.