IACR News item: 27 May 2013
Farzaneh Abed, Christian Forler, Eik List, Stefan Lucks, Jakob Wenzel
ePrint Report
In this paper, we analyze the resistance of the lightweight ciphers PRESENT, LED, and KLEIN to biclique attacks. Primarily, we describe attacks on the full-round versions PRESENT-80, PRESENT-128, LED-64, LED-128, KLEIN-80, and KLEIN-96. Our attacks have time complexities of
$2^{79.49}$, $2^{127.32}$, $2^{63.58}$, $2^{127.42}$, $2^{79.00}$, and $2^{95.18}$ encryptions, respectively. In addition, we consider attacks
on round-reduced versions of PRESENT and LED, to show the security margin for which an adversary can obtain an advantage of at least a factor of two compared to exhaustive search.
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