International Association for Cryptologic Research

IACR News Central

Get an update on changes of the IACR web-page here. For questions, contact newsletter (at) iacr.org. You can also get this service via

To receive your credentials via mail again, please click here.

You can also access the full news archive.

Further sources to find out about changes are CryptoDB, ePrint RSS, ePrint Web, Event calender (iCal).

2012-11-05
07:15 [Election] Independent verifier

  Tom Roeder at Microsoft Research has written an independent verifier for the Helios system. You can access it via the 2012 election page or via this link.



2012-11-02
17:54 [Job][Update] Cryptography Engineer/Cryptography Scientist, Mile 20 Recruiting, LLC, in Bethesda, MD/USA

  Required:

• Senior hands-on engineer with broad experience in cryptography

• Experienced with designing and implementing cryptographic algorithms and key management systems

• Must be familiar with algorithms and protocols including AES-CBC, AES-GCM, SHA, EC-DH, EC-DSA, random number generation, PKI

• Knowledge of Suite B crypto, TLS, smartcards/CAC, X.509, soft certificates, PKCS11

• Experience developing crypto APIs for both internal and external use

• Must have strong skills with C/C++ and/or Java programming languages on multiple platforms

• Ability to work with and mentor a team of programmers

• Ability to obtain US security clearance.

Highly desired:

• Familiar with FIPS 140-2 process, VPNs, S/MIME, data at rest crypto, and other cryptographic products.

• Familiar with DoD and US Federal requirements and regulations related to cryptography for SBU/CUI and classified data.

• Familiar with secure voice protocols, such as SRTP, SIP/TLS, SSIP, zRTP, etc.

• Ability to create high-level software design documents.

• Experience writing device drivers, low-level APIs, or software development kits.

• Familiar with implementing crypto in hardware in ASIC or FPGA-based systems

• BA/BS, MS, Ph.D. degree in Cryptography, Mathematics, Computer Science, Software Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering or equivalent experience.

• CISSP, CSSLP, or SANS certifications



12:09 [PhD][New] Shi Bai: Polynomial selection for the number field sieve

  Name: Shi Bai
Topic: Polynomial selection for the number field sieve
Category: foundations



12:08 [PhD][New] Richard Brent

  Name: Richard Brent


12:06 [PhD][New] Flavio D. Garcia: Formal and Computational Cryptography: Protocols, Hashes and Commitments

  Name: Flavio D. Garcia
Topic: Formal and Computational Cryptography: Protocols, Hashes and Commitments
Category: cryptographic protocols

Description: In modern society we are surrounded by distributed systems. Most electronic devices that are currently on the market have some networking capability or are able to communicate with each other. Communication\r\nover shared media is inherently insecure. Therefore, proper design of security protocols is of primary concern. The design and analysis of security protocols is a challenging task. Several protocols have been proposed in the\r\nliterature which later were found to be flawed. This is a consequence of the intrinsic complexity associated with the presence of a malicious adversary. The traditional complexity-theoretical adversarial model is realistic but complex. As a consequence of this, designing and analyzing protocols in\r\nthis model is error prone. The Dolev-Yao model refers to the attacker model in which an adversary has complete control over the communication media. In this model, the adversary is not bounded in running time but\r\nis completely unable to break any cryptographic primitive. This model is satisfactory as it provides a good level of abstraction. Proofs are simpler than the complexity-theoretical ones, and therefore less error prone, still capturing most common mistakes in the design of security protocols. This thesis addresses the problem of secure protocol design from both formal and computational perspectives and also studies the relation among them. We present four original contributions:\r\n• We present a decentralized digital currency for peer-to-peer and grid applications that is able to detect double-spending of the coins and\r\nother types of fraud.\r\n• We develop a formal framework for the analysis of anonymizing protocols in terms of epistemic logic. We illustrate our approach by proving sender anonymity and unlinkability of some well-known anonymizing protocols.\r\n• We relate the Dolev-Yao model, extended with hash functions, with a realistic computational model. We use a special randomized construction to interpret hashes.[...]


12:06 [PhD][New] Jaap-Henk Hoepman

  Name: Jaap-Henk Hoepman


12:06 [PhD][New] Bart Jacobs

  Name: Bart Jacobs


12:05 [PhD][New] Christophe Clavier

  Name: Christophe Clavier


12:05 [PhD][New] Hans Dobbertin: Verfeinerungsmonoide, Vaught Monoide und Boolesche Algebren

  Name: Hans Dobbertin
Topic: Verfeinerungsmonoide, Vaught Monoide und Boolesche Algebren
Category: (no category)



12:04 [PhD][New] Benoit Feix

  Name: Benoit Feix


12:03 [PhD][New] Pouyan Sepehrdad: Statistical and Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Lightweight and Ultra-Lightweight Symmetric Primitives

  Name: Pouyan Sepehrdad
Topic: Statistical and Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Lightweight and Ultra-Lightweight Symmetric Primitives
Category: secret-key cryptography

Description:

Symmetric cryptographic primitives such as block and stream ciphers are the building blocks in many cryptographic \r\nprotocols. Having such blocks which provide provable security against various types of attacks is often hard. On the \r\nother hand, if possible, such designs are often too costly to be implemented and are usually ignored by practitioners.\r\nMoreover, in RFID protocols or sensor networks, we need lightweight and ultra-lightweight algorithms. Hence, \r\ncryptographers often search for a fair trade-off between security and usability depending on the application. Contrary \r\nto public key primitives, which are often based on some hard problems, security in symmetric key is often based on some\r\nheuristic assumptions. Often, the researchers in this area argue that the security is based on the confidence level the \r\ncommunity has in their design. Consequently, everyday symmetric protocols appear in the literature and stay secure \r\nuntil someone breaks them. In this thesis, we evaluate the security of multiple symmetric primitives against statistical \r\nand algebraic attacks. This thesis is composed of two distinct parts:

\r\n\r\n

In the first part, we investigate the security of RC4 stream cipher against statistical attacks. We focus on its applications \r\nin WEP and WPA protocols. We revisit the previous attacks on RC4 and optimize them. In fact, we propose a framework\r\non how to deal with a pool of biases for RC4 in an optimized manner. During this work, we found multiple new weaknesses \r\nin the corresponding applications. We show that the current best attack on WEP can still be improved. We compare our \r\nresults with the state of the art implementation of the WEP attack on Aircrack-ng program and improve its success rate.\r\nNext, we propose a theoretical key recovery and distinguishing attacks on WPA, which cryptographically break the protocol. \r\nWe perform an extreme amount of experiments to make sure that the proposed theor[...]