Usually a communication link is securedby means of a symmetric-key algorithm. For that, amethod is required to securely establish a symmetric key for that algorithm. This old key establishment
problem is still relevant and of paramount importance both in existing computer networks and new large-scale ubiquitous systems comprising resource-constrained devices.
Identity-based pairwise key agreement allows for the generation of a common key between two parties given a secret keying material
owned by the first party and the identity of the second one. However, existing methods, e.g., based on polynomials, are prone to collusion attacks.
In this paper we discuss a new key establishment scheme aiming at fully collusion-resistant identity-based symmetric-key agreement. Our scheme, the HIMMO algorithm, relies on two design concepts:
Hiding Information and Mixing Modular Operations. Collusion attacks on schemes from literature cannot readily be applied to our scheme; our security analysis further shows that HIMMO\'s design principles
prevent an attacker from performing a number of attacks.
Also, the simple logic of the HIMMO algorithm allows for very efficient implementations in terms of both speed and memory. Finally, being an identitybasedsymmetric-key establishment scheme, HIMMO allows for efficient real-world key exchange protocols.