IACR News item: 25 October 2012
Carmit Hazay, Adriana Lopez-Alt, Hoeteck Wee, Daniel Wichs
ePrint Report- Leakage-resilient public-key encryption from any standard public-key encryption.
- Leakage-resilient weak pseudorandom functions, symmetric-key encryption}, and message-authentication codes from any one-way function.
These are the first constructions of leakage-resilient symmetric-key primitives that do not rely on public-key assumptions. We also get the first constructions of leakage-resilient public-key encryption from ``search assumptions\'\', such as the hardness of factoring or CDH. Although our schemes can tolerate arbitrarily large amounts of leakage, the tolerated rate of leakage (defined as the ratio of leakage-amount to key-size) is rather poor in comparison to prior results under specific assumptions.
As a building block of independent interest, we study a notion of weak hash-proof systems in the public-key and symmetric-key settings. While these inherit some of the interesting security properties of standard hash-proof systems, we can instantiate them under general assumptions.
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