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The Language-based Security (LBS) group (www.lbs.cs.uni-saarland.de) in the Computer Science Department of Saarland University is looking for postdoctoral researchers in security and privacy. The LBS group is part of the newly established Center for IT-Security, Privacy and Accountability (CISPA). CISPA actively supports collaborations with other research centers worldwide, and offers young researchers an ideal working environment. The close connection of CISPA to the Department of Computer Science, the Max-Planck-Institute (MPI) for Informatics, the MPI for Software Systems, the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), the Cluster of Excellence on Multimodal Computing and Interaction (MMCI), the Saarbruecken Graduate School of Computer Science, and the Intel Visual Computing Institute (IVCI) is crucial for the success of the location. All of these institutes are in close proximity on the campus.
Topics of particular interest include, but are not limited to:
Positions are initially offered for two years with an internationally competitive salary.
Applicants must hold a first degree in Computer Science, Mathematics or a related discipline, and have completed, or be near completion of a PhD degree in Computer Science or a closely related area. We expect successful applicants to have a strong background in one or more of the aforementioned research topics and to maintain an outstanding academic track record. The working and teaching language is English.
Applications should contain a CV, a publication list, a research statement, and the names of at least two references. Please send your applicat
Zero-knowledge proofs enable a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true without revealing any other information and are widely used in cryptographic protocols. The goal of the PhD studentship under the supervision of Dr Jens Groth is to develop new and more efficient zero-knowledge techniques. The project is expected to involve both theoretical research and practical work on implementing protocols.
Prospective candidates should have a strong undergraduate degree or masters in mathematics or computer science. The PhD studentship is funded by an ERC Starting Grant on Efficient Cryptographic Arguments and Proofs with a flexible starting date and duration of 4 years. The studentship will provide a tax-free annual stipend of £19,790, however, ERC funding does not cover student fees (currently £4,200 for UK/EU students and £19,250 for Overseas students).
University College London is one of Europe\\\'s highest ranked universities and has recently been recognized by the EPSRC and GCHQ as one of UK\\\'s Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security Research. The Computer Science Department is one of the largest in the UK and is located at UCL\\\'s main campus in the centre of London.
Abstract We describe a state recovery attack on the X-FCSR family of stream ciphers. In this attack we analyse each block of output keystream and try to solve for the state. The solver will succeed when a number of state conditions are satisfied. For X-FCSR-256, our best attack has a computational complexity of only 24.7 table lookups per block of keystream, with an expected 244.3 such blocks before the attack is successful. The precomputational storage requirement is 233. For X-FCSR-128, the computational complexity of our best attack is 216.3 table lookups per block of keystream, where we expect 255.2 output blocks before the attack comes through. The precomputational storage requirement for X-FCSR-128 is 267.
SSE has been the focus of active research and a multitude of schemes that achieve various levels of security and efficiency have been proposed. Any practical SSE scheme, however, should (at a minimum) satisfy the following properties: sublinear search time, security against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks, compact indexes and the ability to add and delete files efficiently. Unfortunately, none of the previously-known SSE constructions achieve all these properties at the same time. This severely limits the practical value of SSE and decreases its chance of deployment in real-world cloud storage systems.
To address this, we propose the first SSE scheme to satisfy all the properties outlined above. Our construction extends the inverted index approach (Curtmola et al., CCS 2006) in several non-trivial ways and introduces new techniques for the design of SSE. In addition, we implement our scheme and conduct a performance evaluation, showing that our approach is highly efficient and ready for deployment.
In this paper, we propose a generic method to transform a broadcast encryption scheme into a trace and revoke scheme. This transformation involves imposing a fingerprinting code over the underlying BE transmissions. In conventional usage of fingerprinting codes, this will inflate the public key size with an additional data linear in the length of the code. To restrain from such increase in public key size, we introduce a new property, called public samplability, of a fingerprinting code. This property enables us to simulate the code independently from the actual code generated for tracing purposes. We have proved this property for the open fingerprinting code of .
We have instantiated our generic transformation with the BE schemes of [4, 12, 19]: we introduce (i) trace and revoke schemes with constant private key size and short ciphertext size, (ii) the first ID-based trace and revoke scheme, (iii) the first publicly traceable scheme with constant private key size and (iv) the first trace and revoke scheme against pirate rebroadcasting attack in the public key setting.