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15:17 [Pub][ePrint] Security margin evaluation of SHA-3 contest finalists through SAT-based attacks, by Ekawat Homsirikamol and Pawel Morawiecki and Marcin Rogawski and Marian Srebrny

  In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. In this paper, the security margin of five SHA-3 finalists is evaluated with an assumption that attacks launched on finalists should be practically verified. A method of attacks applied is called logical cryptanalysis where the original task is expressed as a SATisfiability problem instance. A new toolkit is used to simplify the most arduous stages of this type of cryptanalysis and helps to mount the attacks in a uniform way. In the context of SAT-based attacks, it has been shown that all the finalists have substantially bigger security margin than the current standards SHA-256 and SHA-1. Two other metrics, software performance and hardware efficiency are combined with security results to provide a more comprehensive picture of the SHA-3 finalists.

06:17 [Pub][ePrint] Low complexity bit-parallel $GF(2^m)$ multiplier for all-one polynomials, by Yin Li and Gong-liang Chen and Xiao-ning Xie

  This paper presents a new bit-parallel multiplier for the finite

field $GF(2^m)$ generated with an irreducible all-one polynomial.

Redundant representation is used to reduce the time delay of the

proposed multiplier, while a three-term Karatsuba-like formula is

combined with this representation to decrease the space complexity.

As a result, the proposed multiplier requires about 10 percent fewer

AND/XOR gates than the most efficient bit-parallel multipliers using

an all-one polynomial, while it has almost the same time delay as

the previously proposed ones.

06:17 [Pub][ePrint] Revisiting Key Schedule\'s Diffusion In Relation With Round Function\'s Diffusion, by Jialin Huang and Xuejia Lai

  We study the weakness of key schedules from an observation: many existing attacks use the fact that the key schedules poorly distribute

key bits in the diffusion path of round function.

This reminds us of the importance of the diffusion\'s relation between key schedule and round function.

We present new cryptanalysis results by exploring such diffusion relation and propose a new criterion for necessary key schedule diffusion.

We discuss potential attacks and summarize the causes for key schedules without satisfying this criterion.

One major cause is that overlapping between the diffusion of key schedule and round function leads to information leakage of key bits.

Finally, a measure to estimate our criterion for recursive key schedules is presented.

Today designing key schedule still lacks practical and necessary principles.

For a practical key schedule with limited diffusion, our work adds more insight to its requirements and helps to maximize the security level.

06:17 [Pub][ePrint] Beyond eCK: Perfect Forward Secrecy under Actor Compromise and Ephemeral-Key Reveal, by Cas Cremers and Michèle Feltz

  We show that it is possible to achieve perfect forward secrecy in two-message or one-round key exchange (KE) protocols that satisfy even stronger security properties than provided by the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model. In particular, we consider perfect forward secrecy in the presence of adversaries that can reveal ephemeral secret keys and the long-term secret keys of the actor of a session (similar to Key Compromise Impersonation).

We propose two new game-based security models for KE protocols. First, we formalize a slightly stronger variant of the eCK security model that we call eCKw. Second, we integrate perfect forward secrecy into eCKw, which gives rise to the even stronger eCK-PFS model. We propose a security-strengthening transformation (i.e., a compiler) between our new models. Given a two-message Diffie-Hellman type protocol secure in eCKw, our transformation yields a two-message protocol that is secure in eCK-PFS. As an example, we show how our transformation can be applied to the NAXOS protocol.

06:17 [Pub][ePrint] Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware, by Romain Bardou and Riccardo Focardi and Yusuke Kawamoto and Lorenzo Simionato and Graham Steel and Joe-Kai Tsay

  We show how to exploit the encrypted key import functions of a

variety of different cryptographic devices to reveal the imported

key. The attacks are padding oracle attacks, where error messages

resulting from incorrectly padded plaintexts are used as a side

channel. In the asymmetric encryption case, we modify and improve

Bleichenbacher\'s attack on RSA PKCS#1v1.5 padding, giving new

cryptanalysis that allows us to carry out the `million message

attack\' in a mean of 49 000 and median of 14 500 oracle calls in the

case of cracking an unknown valid ciphertext under a 1024 bit key

(the original algorithm takes a mean of 215 000 and a median of 163

000 in the same case). We show how implementation details of certain

devices admit an attack that requires only 9 400 operations on

average (3 800 median). For the symmetric case, we adapt Vaudenay\'s

CBC attack, which is already highly efficient. We demonstrate the

vulnerabilities on a number of commercially available cryptographic

devices, including security tokens, smartcards

and the Estonian electronic ID card. The attacks are

efficient enough to be practical: we give timing details for all

the devices found to be vulnerable, showing how our optimisations make a qualitative difference to the practicality of the attack.

We give mathematical analysis of the effectiveness of the attacks,

extensive empirical results, and a discussion of countermeasures and manufacturer reaction.

06:17 [Pub][ePrint] Weaknesses of an Improvement Authentication Scheme using , by Rafael Martínez-Peláez and Francisco Rico-Novella

  Recently, Sood-Sarje-Singh proposed an improvement to Liou et al.\'s dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards to prevent impersonation attack, malicious user attack, off-line password guessing attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. However, we demonstrate that Sood et al.\'s scheme is still vulnerable to malicious user attack, impersonation attack and steal information from a database attack.

06:17 [Pub][ePrint] DAC-MACS: Effective Data Access Control for Multi-Authority Cloud Storage Systems, by Kan Yang and Xiaohua Jia and Kui Ren

  Data access control is an effective way to ensure the data security in the cloud. However, due to data outsourcing and untrusted cloud servers, the data access control becomes a challenging issue in cloud storage systems. Existing access control schemes are no longer applicable to cloud storage systems, because they either produce multiple encrypted copies of the same data or require a fully trusted cloud server.

Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising technique for access control of encrypted data. It requires a trusted authority manages all the attributes and distributes keys in the system. In cloud storage systems, there are multiple authorities co-exist and each authority is able to issue attributes independently.

However, existing CP-ABE schemes cannot be directly applied to the access control for multi-authority cloud storage systems, due to the inefficiency of decryption and revocation. In this paper, we propose DAC-MACS (Data Access Control for Multi-Authority Cloud Storage), an effective and secure data access control scheme with efficient decryption and revocation. Specifically, we construct a new multi-authority CP-ABE scheme with efficient decryption and also design an efficient attribute revocation method that can achieve both forward security and backward security. The analysis and the simulation results show that our DAC-MACS is highly efficient and provably secure under the security model.

16:31 [Event][New] FC13: Financial Crypto

  Submission: 13 October 2012
Notification: 17 December 2012
From April 1 to April 5
Location: Okinawa, Japan
More Information:

06:17 [Pub][JoC] A Comparison of Cryptanalytic Tradeoff Algorithms


Abstract  Three time-memory tradeoff algorithms are compared in this paper. Specifically, the classical tradeoff algorithm by Hellman, the distinguished point tradeoff method, and the rainbow table method, in their non-perfect table versions, are treated. We show that, under parameters and assumptions that are typically considered in theoretic discussions of the tradeoff algorithms, the Hellman and distinguished point tradeoffs perform very close to each other and the rainbow table method performs somewhat better than the other two algorithms. Our method of comparison can easily be applied to other situations, where the conclusions could be different. The analysis of tradeoff efficiency presented in this paper does not ignore the effects of false alarms and also covers techniques for reducing storage, such as ending point truncations and index tables. Our comparison of algorithms fully takes into account success probabilities and precomputation efforts.

  • Content Type Journal Article
  • Pages 1-79
  • DOI 10.1007/s00145-012-9128-3
  • Authors

    • Jin Hong, Department of Mathematical Sciences and ISaC, Seoul National University, Seoul, 151-747 Korea
    • Sunghwan Moon, Department of Mathematics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-3368, USA

    • Journal Journal of Cryptology
    • Online ISSN 1432-1378
    • Print ISSN 0933-2790

From: Wed, 25 Jul 2012 14:55:57 GMT

07:33 [Job][New] Security Expert for Smart Card and Embedded Devices, Samsung Electronics, Republic of Korea (South Korea)

  Samsung is opening the job position for the smart card security expert. The detailed job description is as follows:

- Participate to the specification of the next generation security devices in collaboration with the design team, propose new security features

- Customer support for security and security promotion

- Support CC/EMV certification

- Attend & follow-up the smart card security related standard & organization (JHAS...)

- Survey and study the up-to-date attack/countermeasure techniques and the relevant result from crypto/security research communities

The successful candidates are expected to have expertise in one or more of the following areas:

- strong experience in smart card security and more generally embedded device security (SW or HW)

- security architecture specification

- security evaluation and the attack technologies including various side channel analysis attacks

- firmware design

- EMVco / Common Criteria certifications.

The candidates are preferred to work in South Korea but it is negotiable.

The application should include the current curriculum vitae.

14:30 [Job][New] Research and PhD positions, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom

  We have several doctoral and research associate positions within ASECOLAB, Adaptive Security and Economics Lab, founded at Royal Holloway, University of London by Prof Dusko Pavlovic. Some of the research directions of the Lab are indicated in the article \\\"Gaming security by obscurity\\\", NSPW 2011. Candidates with interests in the broad area of mathematical and economic models of security processes are encouraged to apply. Salaries will be competitive. The positions are for fixed term, under the standard academic conditions.

Royal Holloway is located in Egham, in the convenient and attractive area between London Heathrow and Windsor Great Park.

Please apply at The screening of the candidates will begin on August 20th, and will continue until the positions are filled. Please email Dusko.Pavlovic (at) for informal discussions about the posts. For inquiries about the application process please contact Claire.Hudson (at)