
Voting for IACR

Some low-tech options

Antoine Joux


Current voting system



Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

- Few returned ballots (many late/lost ?)
- Vote coercion/buying/stealing easy
 - But may be irrelevant, could create new members
- Cost of system (postal fees for IACR and members)
- Workload for election officers
- Need to trust election officers
 - For correctness and anonymity

Possible hybrid system



Offline Archive/Counting

Quick security facts

- Need to trust mixing
- Need to trust outgoing postal service

- Intercepted ballots can be used by Adversary

- Vote Coercion/Buying still possible
- Viruses on user's computer useless
 - Except to attack availability

Possible additional security measures

- Error detection to help OTP input
- Allow returning ballots by snail-mail for improved availability
- Return signed receipts to user to allow checking that ballots indeed arrived
- Write received ballots on write-only devices
- Careful counting (remove invalid votes, remove exact duplicates, cancel multiple voting, priority to snail-mail ballots)

Motivations

- Simple scheme to benchmark proposals
 - Security, cost, ...
- Removes need for securing computing device on user's side
- Clearly unsuitable for political elections (do not scale, easy coercion, ...)
- This is fun but probably not original
 - references anyone ?