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Improved Trace-Driven Cache-Collision Attacks against Embedded AES Implementations
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Abstract: | In this paper we present two attacks that exploit cache events, which are visible in some side channel, to derive a secret key used in an implementation of AES. The first is an improvement of an adaptive chosen plaintext attack presented at ACISP 2006. The second is a new known plaintext attack that can recover a 128-bit key with approximately 30 measurements to reduce the number of key hypotheses to $2^{28}$. This is comparable to classical Differential Power Analysis; however, our attacks are able to overcome certain masking techniques. We also show how to deal with unreliable cache event detection in the real-life measurement scenario and present practical explorations on a 32-bit ARM microprocessor. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23309, title={Improved Trace-Driven Cache-Collision Attacks against Embedded AES Implementations}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={implementation / Side channel attacks, power analysis, cache attacks, AES}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/408}, note={An extended abstract of this paper will appear at WISA 2010. This is the full version. jean-francois.gallais@uni.lu 14811 received 21 Jul 2010, last revised 21 Jul 2010}, author={Jean-François Gallais and Ilya Kizhvatov and Michael Tunstall}, year=2010 }