CryptoDB
Exponential Bounds for Information Leakage in Unknown-Message Side-Channel Attacks
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| Abstract: | In Backes&Kopf(2008), the authors introduced an important new information theoretic numerical measure for assessing a system's resistance to unknown-message side-channel attacks and computed a formula for the limit of the numerical values defined by this measure as the number of side-channel observations tends to infinity. Here, we present corresponding quantitative (exponential) bounds that yield an actual rate-of-convergence for this limit, something not given in Backes&Kopf(2008). Such rate-of-convergence results can potentially be used to significantly strengthen the utility of the limit formula of Backes&Kopf(2008) as a tool to reduce computational complexity difficulties associated with calculating the side-channel attack resistance measure presented there. In addition, our arguments here show how the arguments used in Backes&Kopf(2008) to prove the limit formula can be substantially simplified. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23292,
title={Exponential Bounds for Information Leakage in Unknown-Message Side-Channel Attacks},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={Side Channel Attacks, Information Theory},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/391},
note={ danielzanger@gmail.com 14799 received 9 Jul 2010},
author={Daniel Z. Zanger},
year=2010
}