## CryptoDB

### Paper: First-Order Side-Channel Attacks on the Permutation Tables Countermeasure Extended Version

Authors: Emmanuel Prouff Robert McEvoy URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/385 Search ePrint Search Google The use of random permutation tables as a side-channel attack countermeasure was recently proposed by Coron [6]. The countermeasure operates by ensuring that during the execution of an algorithm, each intermediate variable that is handled is in a permuted form described by the random permutation tables. In this paper, we examine the application of this countermeasure to the AES algorithm as described in [6], and show that certain operations admit first-order side-channel leakage. New side-channel attacks are developed to exploit these flaws, using correlation-based and mutual information-based methods. The attacks have been verified in simulation, and in practice on a smart card.
##### BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23286,
title={First-Order Side-Channel Attacks on the Permutation Tables Countermeasure Extended Version},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={implementation / Side Channel Attack, Countermeasure, AES},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/385},
note={A short version of this paper has been published in the proceedings of CHES 2009 conference. e.prouff@oberthur.com 14797 received 7 Jul 2010},
author={Emmanuel Prouff and Robert McEvoy},
year=2010
}