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Garbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs

Authors:
Kimmo U. Järvinen
Vladimir Kolesnikov
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Thomas Schneider
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/276
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Abstract: The power of side-channel leakage attacks on cryptographic implementations is evident. Today's practical defenses are typically attack-specific countermeasures against certain classes of side-channel attacks. The demand for a more general solution has given rise to the recent theoretical research that aims to build provably leakage-resilient cryptography. This direction is, however, very new and still largely lacks practitioners' evaluation with regard to both efficiency and practical security. A recent approach, One-Time Programs (OTPs), proposes using Yao's Garbled Circuit (GC) and very simple tamper-proof hardware to securely implement oblivious transfer, to guarantee leakage resilience. Our main contributions are (i) a generic architecture for using GC/OTP modularly, and (ii) hardware implementation and efficiency analysis of GC/OTP evaluation. We implemented two FPGA-based prototypes: a system-on-a-programmable-chip with access to hardware crypto accelerator (suitable for smartcards and future smartphones), and a stand-alone hardware implementation (suitable for ASIC design). We chose AES as a representative complex function for implementation and measurements. As a result of this work, we are able to understand, evaluate and improve the practicality of employing GC/OTP as a leakage-resistance approach. Last, but not least, we believe that our work contributes to bringing together the results of both theoretical and practical communities.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23177,
  title={Garbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={Garbled Circuit, Hardware Implementation, Leakage-Resilience, One-Time Programs, Secure Function Evaluation},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/276},
  note={Full version of CHES 2010 paper. thomas.schneider@trust.rub.de 14777 received 11 May 2010, last revised 17 Jun 2010},
  author={Kimmo U. Järvinen and Vladimir Kolesnikov and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Thomas Schneider},
  year=2010
}