## CryptoDB

### Paper: Modeling Attacks on Physical Unclonable Functions

Authors: Ulrich Rührmair Frank Sehnke Jan Sölter Gideon Dror Srinivas Devadas Jürgen Schmidhuber URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/251 Search ePrint Search Google We show in this paper how several proposed Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be broken by numerical modeling attacks. Given a set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of a PUF, our attacks construct a computer algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the original PUF on almost all CRPs. This algorithm can subsequently impersonate the PUF, and can be cloned and distributed arbitrarily. This breaks the security of essentially all applications and protocols that are based on the respective PUF. The PUFs we attacked successfully include standard Arbiter PUFs and Ring Oscillator PUFs of arbitrary sizes, and XOR Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs of up to a given size and complexity. Our attacks are based upon various machine learning techniques, including Logistic Regression and Evolution Strategies. Our work will be useful to PUF designers and attackers alike.
##### BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23152,
title={Modeling Attacks on Physical Unclonable Functions},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={Implementation / Physical Unclonable Functions, Cryptanalysis, Machine Learning, Physical Cryptography},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/251},
note={--- ruehrmai@in.tum.de 14732 received 1 May 2010, last revised 3 May 2010},
author={Ulrich Rührmair and Frank Sehnke and Jan  Sölter and Gideon Dror and Srinivas Devadas and Jürgen Schmidhuber},
year=2010
}