CryptoDB
A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement
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Abstract: | The Canetti--Krawczyk (CK) and extended Canetti--Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for key agreement protocols. We discuss security shades in the (e)CK models, and some practical attacks unconsidered in (e)CK--security arguments. We propose a strong security model which encompasses the eCK one. We also propose a new protocol, called Strengthened MQV (SMQV), which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper--proof device is used to store long--lived keys, while session keys are used on an untrusted host machine. The SMQV protocol meets our security definition under the Gap Diffie--Hellman assumption and the Random Oracle model. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23138, title={A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={authenticated key agreement, practical vulnerability, strengthened eCK model, SMQV}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/237}, note={A short version of this paper is accepted at SCN 2010 a.sarr@netheos.net, augussarr@yahoo.fr, 14778 received 27 Apr 2010, last revised 18 Jun 2010}, author={JeanClaude Bajard and Augustin P. Sarr and Philippe ElbazVincent}, year=2010 }