Title | A Note on Bounded Chosen Ciphertext Security from Black-box Semantical Security |
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Booktitle | IACR Eprint archive |

Pages | |

Year | 2006 |

URL | http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/391 |

Author | Ronald Cramer |

Author | Dennis Hofheinz |

Author | Eike Kiltz |

Abstract | Designing public key encryption schemes withstanding chosen ciphertext attacks, which is the highest security level for such schemes, is generally perceived as a delicate and intricate task, and for good reason. In the standard model, there are essentially three well-known but quite involved approaches. This state of affairs is to be contrasted with the situation for semantically secure encryption schemes, a much weaker security notion that only guarantees security in the absence of active attack but that appears to be much easier to fulfill, both conceptually and practically. Thus, the boundary between passive attack and active attack seems to make up the dividing line between which security levels are relatively easily achieved and which are not. Our contributions are two-fold. First, we show a simple, efficient black-box construction of a public key encryption scheme withstanding chosen ciphertext attack from any given semantically secure one. Our scheme is $q$-bounded in the sense that security is only guaranteed if the adversary makes at most $q$ adaptive chosen ciphertext queries. Here, $q$ is an arbitrary polynomial that is fixed in advance in the key-generation. Our work thus shows that whether or not the number of active, adversarial queries is known in advance is the dividing line, and not passive versus active attack. In recent work, Gertner, Malkin and Myers show that such black-box reductions are impossible if instead $q$ is a polynomial that only depends on the adversary. Thus, in a sense, our result appears to be the best black-box result one can hope for. Second, we give a non-blackbox reduction from bounded chosen ciphertext security to semantic security where the length of the public/secret keys and ciphertexts drops from quadratic to linear in $q$, compared to our black-box construction. This latter scheme, however, is only of theoretical interest as it uses general NP-reductions, and our blackbox construction is in fact much more practical. |

@misc{eprint-2006-21882, title={A Note on Bounded Chosen Ciphertext Security from Black-box Semantical Security}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={foundations / Black-box construction, chosen-ciphertext security}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/391}, note={ kiltz@cwi.nl 13464 received 6 Nov 2006, last revised 12 Nov 2006}, author={Ronald Cramer and Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz}, year=2006 }