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Analyzing the HB and HB+ Protocols in the ``Large Error'' Case
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| Abstract: | HB and HB+ are two shared-key, unidirectional authentication protocols whose extremely low computational cost makes them potentially well-suited for severely resource-constrained devices. Security of these protocols is based on the conjectured hardness of learning parity with noise; that is, learning a secret $s$ given ``noisy'' dot products of $s$ that are incorrect with probability $\epsilon$. Although the problem of learning parity with noise is meaningful for any constant $\epsilon < 1/2$, existing proofs of security for HB and HB+ only imply security when $\epsilon < 1/4$. In this note, we show how to extend these proofs to the case of arbitrary $\epsilon < 1/2$. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21817,
title={Analyzing the HB and HB+ Protocols in the ``Large Error'' Case},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols / RFID},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/326},
note={ jkatz@cs.umd.edu 13418 received 26 Sep 2006},
author={Jonathan Katz and Adam Smith},
year=2006
}