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Paper: Independent Zero-Knowledge Sets

Authors:
Rosario Gennaro
Silvio Micali
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/155
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Abstract: We define and construct Independent Zero-Knowledge Sets (ZKS) protocols. In a ZKS protocols, a Prover commits to a set $S$, and for any $x$, proves non-interactively to a Verifier if $x \in S$ or $x \notin S$ without revealing any other information about $S$. In the {\em independent} ZKS protocols we introduce, the adversary is prevented from successfully correlate her set to the one of a honest prover. Our notion of independence in particular implies that the resulting ZKS protocol is non-malleable. On the way to this result we define the notion of {\em independence} for commitment schemes. It is shown that this notion implies non-malleability, and we argue that this new notion has the potential to simplify the design and security proof of non-malleable commitment schemes. Efficient implementations of ZKS protocols are based on the notion of mercurial commitments. Our efficient constructions of independent ZKS protocols requires the design of {\em new} commitment schemes that are simultaneously independent (and thus non-malleable) and mercurial.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21648,
  title={Independent Zero-Knowledge Sets},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={foundations / zero-knowledge, non-malleability},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/155},
  note={Extended version of the paper that will appear in the ICALP'06 proceedings rosario@us.ibm.com 13262 received 24 Apr 2006},
  author={Rosario Gennaro and Silvio Micali},
  year=2006
}