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Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB
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Abstract: | With increased use of passive RFID tags, the need for secure lightweight identification protocols arose. HB+ is one such protocol, which was proven secure in the detection-based model, but shown breakable by man-in-the-middle attacks. Trusted-HB is a variant of HB+, specifically designed to resist man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we discuss several weaknesses of Trusted-HB, show that the formal security proof provided by its designers is incorrect, and demonstrate how to break it in realistic scenarios. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2009-18272, title={Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / RFID, LPN, HB+, Trusted-HB}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/044}, note={ dmitry.frumkin@gmail.com 14270 received 26 Jan 2009}, author={Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir}, year=2009 }