International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Paper: Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512

Authors:
Zhimin Li
Daofeng Li
Download:
URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026
Search ePrint
Search Google
Abstract: In this paper, we present a collision attack on the hash function NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function is only determined by partial state words. Its complexity is about $2^{128}$ (much lower than the complexity of the corresponding birthday attack) and its probability is more than $(1- \frac{2}{{2^{64} - 1}})^2$ ($\gg \frac{1}{2}$).
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2009-18253,
  title={Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026},
  note={ lizhimin1981@gmail.com 14269 received 11 Jan 2009, last revised 25 Jan 2009},
  author={Zhimin Li and Daofeng Li},
  year=2009
}