CryptoDB
Various Security Analysis of a pfCM-MD Hash Domain Extension and Applications based on the Extension
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| Abstract: | We propose a new hash domain extension \textit{a prefix-free-Counter-Masking-MD (pfCM-MD)}. And, among security notions for the hash function, we focus on the indifferentiable security notion by which we can check whether the structure of a given hash function has any weakness or not. Next, we consider the security of HMAC, two new prf constructions, NIST SP 800-56A key derivation function, and the randomized hashing in NIST SP 800-106, where all of them are based on the pfCM-MD. Especially, due to the counter of the pfCM-MD, the pfCM-MD are secure against all of generic second-preimage attacks such as Kelsey-Schneier attack \cite{KeSc05} and Elena {\em et al.}' attck \cite{AnBoFoHoKeShZi08}. Our proof technique and most of notations follow those in \cite{BeDaPeAs08,Bellare06,BeCaKr96a}. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-18178,
title={Various Security Analysis of a pfCM-MD Hash Domain Extension and Applications based on the Extension},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={secret-key cryptography / Hash Domain Extension, MAC, PRF, Randomized Hashing},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/460},
note={ pointchang@gmail.com 14184 received 1 Nov 2008},
author={Donghoon Chang and Seokhie Hong and Jaechul Sung and Sangjin Lee},
year=2008
}