International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Paper: The Effectiveness of Receipt-Based Attacks on ThreeBallot

Authors:
Kevin Henry
Douglas R. Stinson
Jiayuan Sui
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/287
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Abstract: The ThreeBallot voting system is an end-to-end (E2E) voter-verifiable voting system. Each voter fills out three ballots according to a few simple rules and takes a copy of one of them home as a receipt for verification purposes. All ballots are posted on a public bulletin board so that any voter may verify the result. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of attacks using the voter's receipt and the bulletin board. We determine thresholds for when the voter's vote can be reconstructed from a receipt, and when a coercer can effectively verify if a voter followed instructions by looking for prespecified patterns on the bulletin board. Combining these two results allows us to determine safe ballot sizes that resist known attacks. We also generalize a previous observation that an individual receipt can leak information about a voter's choices.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13567,
  title={The Effectiveness of Receipt-Based Attacks on ThreeBallot},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={applications / voting, receipt-based, attack},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/287},
  note={ k2henry@cs.uwaterloo.ca 13780 received 26 Jul 2007, last revised 24 Sep 2007},
  author={Kevin Henry and Douglas R. Stinson and Jiayuan Sui},
  year=2007
}