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HB++: a Lightweight Authentication Protocol Secure against Some Attacks
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Abstract: | At Crypto'05, Juels and Weis introduce HB+, an enhancement of the Hopper and Blum (HB) authentication protocol. This protocol HB+ is proven secure against active attacks, though preserving HB's advantages: mainly, requiring so few resources to run that it can be implemented on an RFID tag. However, in a wider adversarial model, Gilbert, Robshaw and Sibert exhibit a very effective attack against HB+. We here show how a modification of the HB+ protocol thwarts Gilbert et al's attack. The resulting protocol, HB++, remains a good candidate for RFID tags authentication. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12773, title={HB++: a Lightweight Authentication Protocol Secure against Some Attacks}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / HB+ protocol, active attacks, RFID}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/440}, note={ julien.bringer@sagem.com 13187 received 30 Nov 2005, last revised 12 Jan 2006, withdrawn 8 Feb 2006}, author={Julien Bringer and Hervé Chabanne and Emmanuelle Dottax}, year=2005 }