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Attack on Okamoto et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes
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Abstract: | We present an attack on a new short signature scheme from bilinear pairing proposed by Okamoto $et$ $al.$ at ITCC'05. We show that any one can derive the secret key of the signer from any two message-signature pairs and so can forge the signer's signature for any message. This means the scheme is totally broken. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12575, title={Attack on Okamoto et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={Short Signature, Bilinear Pairing, Attack}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/240}, note={2005 China National Computer Conference isdzhfg@zsu.edu.cn 12986 received 21 Jul 2005}, author={Fangguo Zhang and Xiaofeng Chen}, year=2005 }