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Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes
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Abstract: | Some message authentication codes (MACs) are vulnerable to multiple forgery attacks, in which an attacker can gain information that allows her to succeed in forging multiple message/tag pairs. This property was first noted in MACs based on universal hashing, such as the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for block ciphers. However, we show that CBC-MAC and HMAC also have this property, and for some parameters are more vulnerable than GCM. We present multiple-forgery attacks against these algorithms, then analyze the security against these attacks by using the expected number of forgeries. We compare the different MACs using this measure. This document is a pre-publication draft manuscript. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12497, title={Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / message authentication codes}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/161}, note={unpublished mcgrew@cisco.com 12934 received 31 May 2005}, author={David A. McGrew and Scott R. Fluhrer}, year=2005 }