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On The Indistinguishability-Based Security Model of Key Agreement Protocols-Simple Cases
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| Abstract: | Since Bellare and Rogway's work [15], the indistinguishability-based security models of authenticated key agreement protocols in simple cases have been evolving for ten years. In this report, we review and organize the models under a unified framework with some new extensions. By providing a new ability (the Coin query) to adversaries and redefining two key security notions, the framework fully exploits an adversary's capability and can be used to prove all the commonly required security attributes of key agreement protocols with key confirmation. At the same time, the Coin query is also used to define a model which can be used to heuristically evaluate the security of a large category of authenticated protocols without key confirmation. We use the models to analyze a few pairing-based authenticated key agreement protocols. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12465,
title={On The Indistinguishability-Based Security Model of Key Agreement Protocols-Simple Cases},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols / key agreement formulation model, pairing-based key agreement},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/129},
note={Extended abstract appeared on ACNS 2004 m.z.cheng@mdx.ac.uk 12930 received 30 Apr 2005, last revised 27 May 2005},
author={Zhaohui Cheng and Manos Nistazakis and Richard Comley and Luminita Vasiu},
year=2005
}