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Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections and Write-in Ballots
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Abstract: | We present a voting protocol that protects voters' privacy and achieves universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and uncoercibility without ad hoc physical assumptions or procedural constraints (such as untappable channels, voting booths, smart cards, third-party randomizers, and so on). We discuss under which conditions the scheme allows voters to cast write-in ballots, and we show how it can be practically implemented through voter-verified (paper) ballots. The scheme allows voters to combine voting credentials with their chosen votes applying the homomorphic properties of certain probabilistic cryptosystems. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12078, title={Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections and Write-in Ballots}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={applications / Electronic Voting, Receipt-Freeness, Uncoercibility, Write-In Ballots, Voter-verified Ballots, Homomorphic Encryption, Paillier cryptosystem.}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/105}, note={ acquisti@andrew.cmu.edu 12542 received 4 May 2004}, author={Alessandro Acquisti}, year=2004 }