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Algebraic Attacks on Summation Generators
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Abstract: | We apply the algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with memories to the summation generator. For a summation generator that uses $n$ LFSRs, the algebraic equation relating the key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to $2^{\lceil\log_2 n \rceil}$, using $\lceil\log_2 n \rceil + 1$ consecutive key stream bits. This is much lower than the upper bound given by previous general results. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11942, title={Algebraic Attacks on Summation Generators}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={stream ciphers, algebraic attacks, summation generators}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/229}, note={ dlee@etri.re.kr 12363 received 3 Nov 2003, last revised 6 Nov 2003}, author={Dong Hoon Lee and Jaeheon Kim and Jin Hong and Jae Woo Han and Dukjae Moon}, year=2003 }