CryptoDB
A Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme with Statistical zero-knowledge
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Abstract: | In this paper, we first propose a protocol in which the prover can show that a=b holds for two committed integers a and b; also, we present a protocol in which the prover can prove that a\neq 0 holds for committed integer a; then, we construct a protocol to prove that the degree of a polynomial f(x) equals to t-1 exactly, which has been as an open problem(see[21]); finally, we provide a protocol in which the prover proves that a pair (x,y) is generated by a polynomial f(x), i.e., y=f(x)(mod m), where m is a prime. Based on above four protocols, we put forward a verifiable (t,n)-secret sharing scheme, which can avoid all known the dealer's cheats. In particular, all above protocols are statistical zero-knowledge. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11935, title={A Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme with Statistical zero-knowledge}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing, statistical zero-knowledge}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/222}, note={ ctang@mmrc.iss.ac.cn 12336 received 10 Oct 2003}, author={Chunming Tang and Zhuojun Liu and Mingsheng Wang}, year=2003 }