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Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC
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Abstract: | OMAC, TMAC and XCBC are CBC-type MAC schemes which are provably secure for arbitrary message length. In this paper, we present a more tight upper bound on ${\tt Adv}^{\sf mac}$ for each scheme, where ${\tt Adv}^{\sf mac}$ denotes the maximum success (forgery) probability of adversaries. Our bounds are expressed in terms of the \textit{total length} of all queries of an adversary to the MAC generation oracle while the previous bounds are expressed in terms of the \textit{maximum length} of each query. In particular, a significant improvement occurs if the lengths of queries are heavily unbalanced. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11798, title={Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / modes of operation, message authentication codes, block cipher, provable security.}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/082}, note={ iwata@cis.ibaraki.ac.jp 12172 received 30 Apr 2003}, author={Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa}, year=2003 }